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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
which has a disproportionate racial impact must also be shown
to have a discriminatory purpose to sustain an equal protection
challenge. If purposeful discrimination cannot be shown, then
disproportionate racial impact alone will, at best, trigger a ra-
tional basis standard of review, easily satisfied by bar examin-
ers. Depending on the amount of inconsistency and subjectivity
exhibited by the examiners in passing or failing examinees,
there may be sufficient arbitrariness displayed to overturn a
decision on individuals' entrance to the state bar. With respect
to review procedures, personal review by the examinees them-
selves might well be required to satisfy due process, unless the
state supreme court determines that its own inherent powers
of review are sufficient.
THOMAS L. MILLER
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbi-
tration Required After Expiration of Contract-In the re-
cent case of Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confec-
tionary Workers Union,I the Supreme Court held that a party
to a collective bargaining agreement may be required to arbi-
trate a dispute concerning severance pay pursuant to the arbi-
tration clause of the agreement, even though the dispute arose
after the agreement terminated and after the employer went
out of business at the plant employing the disputing employ-
ees. The Court decided that the employer's duty to arbitrate
survived the termination of the agreement and extended to
disputes which first arise after the employer-employee relation-
ship had been completely severed.
However, Nolde leaves a major question unanswered: The
majority opinion never states how the employer's legally en-
forceable obligation to arbitrate beyond the term of the con-
tract arises. The Court has previously held that the duty im-
posed on parties to submit disputes to arbitration is founded
in a collective bargaining agreement.2 But in Nolde the dispute
arose after the agreement had been terminated. Therefore, the
1. 97 S. Ct. 1067 (1977).
2. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); see
also Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 58 (1970), wherein the NLRB also states
that a party's obligation to arbitrate arises out of a contract.
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holding in Nolde announces a duty to arbitrate, unfounded in
precedent, that is not based only in contract. This view of the
duty to arbitrate is inconsistent with traditional legal reason-
ing, and as the dissent points out, with national labor policy.
As early as United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co. in 1960, the Court has recognized that the collective
bargaining agreement governs the parties' obligation to submit
disputes to arbitration.3 Through the medium of the agreement
the courts can determine the scope of the arbitral obligation
and justify its enforcement. Without an agreement by the par-
ties to be bound by a grievance arbitration procedure, the
courts may not impose such a duty on an employer or a labor
organization.4 If the courts create a duty to arbitrate superior
to that found in the collective bargaining agreement it will be
a denial of the sanctity of that agreement. In effect, the court
will have become a third party to the labor management rela-
tionship.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly answered
the question presented in Nolde of how long the duty, once
created, persists, several circuits have done so. In the case of
IAM Local 2369 v. Oxco Brush Division,5 the Sixth Circuit held
that termination of a contract terminates the duty to arbitrate
expressed in that contract. Therefore, an employer cannot be
required to arbitrate disputes which were not instituted during
the term of the contract.'
In the Oxco Brush case the court stated that as a prerequis-
ite to enforcing a duty to arbitrate it must first be shown that
a valid agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration exists
at the time the dispute arose. Without a showing of an agree-
ment the court can look no further.
The Seventh Circuit has similarly held that obligation to
arbitrate disputes arises solely by agreement and cannot be
imposed on a party as a matter of law.7 In the Nolde case the
Supreme Court has disregarded the reasoning of the Sixth and
3. 363 U.S. 574; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
4. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
5. 517 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
6. Id. at 243.
7. O.L. Workers Local 7-210 v. American Maize Products Co., 492 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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Seventh Circuits, but has failed to state its own reasoning for
taking a different view.
The facts of Nolde were not in dispute.' The employer,
Nolde Brothers, Inc. and the union, Local 358 of the Bakery
Workers, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
which was to remain in effect until July 21, 1973.1 The agree-
ment contained a provi sion for severance pay' ° for employees
having three or more years of active service in the event of lay-
off or displacement due to either automated labor saving de-
vices or the closing of an entire plant. The agreement also
contained a broad arbitration clause." In May 1973 the parties
began negotiations on a new contract, but no agreement was
concluded by July 21, the date on which the existing contract
8. See the opinion of the district court, Bakery Workers Local 358 v. Nolde Bros.,
Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974).
9. 97 S. Ct. at 1069.
10. Article IX-Wages of the agreement concerning severance pay read as follows:
Section 5. Each full-time employee who is permanently displaced from his
employment with the Company by reason of the introduction of labor saving
equipment, the closing of a department, the closing of an entire plant, or by lay
off, shall be compensated for such displacement providing he has been actively
employed by the Company for a period of at least three (3) years. An eligible
employee's compensation for his displacement shall be on the basis of thirty (30)
hours of severance pay, at his straight time hourly rate, for each full year or
major portion of a year of active employment commencing with the fourth (4th)
year following his most recent date of hire. Payment under this formula shall
be limited to a maximum of nine hundred (900) hours of severance pay.
11. The arbitration clause, Article XII-Grievances and Arbitration, read as follows:
Section 1. All grievances shall be first taken up between the Plant Manage-
ment and the Shop Steward. If these parties shall be unable to settle the griev-
ance, then the Business Agent of the Union shall be called in, in an attempt to
arrive at a settlement of the grievance. If these parties are unable to settle the
grievance, the dispute will be settled as called for in Sections 2 and 3 of this
Article.
Section 2. In the event that any grievance cannot be satisfactorily adjusted
by the procedure outlined above, either of the parties hereto may demand arbi-
tration and shall give written notice to the other party of its desire to arbitrate.
No individual employee shall have the right to invoke arbitration without the
written consent of the Union. The Arbitration Board shall consist of three (3)
persons, one selected by the Company and one selected by the Union. The two
persons selected shall agree upon a third person who shall act as Chairman of
the Arbitration Board.
Section 3. The decision or award of the Arbitration Board, or a majority
thereof, shall be final and binding on both parties. If the third party to arbitra-
tion is not selected in ten (10) days from receipt of notice, the Director of the
U.S. Conciliation Service shall be requested to make the appointment. The
expense of the neutral arbitrator shall be borne equally by the parties.
Section 4. Pending negotiations or during arbitration there shall be no
strikes, lockouts, boycotts, or any stoppages of work.
[Vol. 60:1142
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was to terminate. Negotiations continued until August 20,
when the union served a seven day written notice on the em-
ployer, required under the terms of the contract, of its intent
to terminate the agreement. On August 31, after the contract
had terminated, the employer closed down its entire Norfolk
bakery. The employer paid the employees' accrued wages and
vacation pay under the terminated agreement, and, in addi-
tion, wages for the four days after the termination of the con-
tract and the closing of the plant. The employer refused to
grant the union's demand for severance pay and also refused
to arbitrate the matter.12
The union instituted an action in the district court under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 3 for an
order compelling Nolde to arbitrate the dispute or, in the alter-
native, for an award of the severance pay. The union contended
that the severance pay was a vested right which survived the
expiration of the contract. 4 Nolde, on the other hand, con-
tended that the employees' right to severance pay terminated
with the agreement. The district court refused to grant the
union relief, holding that the employees were not entitled to the
severance pay because it was not a vested right. 5 Since the
court decided the case on its merits, it never directly faced the
issue of arbitration. However, in dicta, the court noted that no
duty to arbitrate could be imposed on Nolde because the dis-
pute arose only after the contract had been terminated. 6 Citing
the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 17
the court stated: "The duty to arbitrate is created by contract
and '[n]o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely
by operation of law'."' 8 Furthermore, as a procedural matter,
the court stated that it did not have the authority under the
12. 97 S. Ct. at 1070.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
14. The Court noted that the union's contention could have some merit. Nolde did
pay his employees' vacation pay which had accrued under the expired contract which
could indicate that other benefits such as severance pay could extend beyond the term
of the contract. Furthermore, the severance pay benefits were listed under article IX
of the contract entitled "Wages." The district court, however, reviewing the merits of
the dispute did not consider such evidence of controlling significance. See 382 F. Supp.
1354, 1357.
15. 382 F. Supp. 1354.
16. Id. at 1358.
17. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
18. 382 F. Supp. at 1359.
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Uniform Arbitration Act'9 to order the employer to arbitrate
the dispute without a showing by the union that an enforceable
written agreement between the parties existed when the dis-
pute arose.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed."0 The circuit court criticized the dis-
trict court for deciding, the case on the merits without first
determining whether the dispute was subject to arbitration. '
The court stated that a prerequisite to the district court's dis-
position of the dispute on its merits was an affirmative finding
that the dispute was not subject to arbitration. If the dispute
was in fact subject to arbitration, then it was within the exclu-
sive province of the arbitrator to hear the merits of the dispute.
The remaining portion of the Fourth Circuit decision is clearly
reflected in the decision by the Supreme Court holding that
Nolde was obligated to submit this dispute to the arbitral pro-
cess.
In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court was faced with two related, but very distinct ques-
tions. First, the Court had to determine whether the dispute
over the severance pay was in fact subject to arbitration under
the pre-existing contract. The second, and by far the more
difficult of the two questions was whether Nolde was under an
affirmative legal obligation to proceed with the arbitration,
even though the dispute arose after the contract imposing the
duty of arbitration on Nolde in the first instance had termi-
nated.
The Court answered very summarily the question of
whether the severance pay dispute was covered by the arbitra-
tion clause. The severance pay issue arose out of differing inter-
pretations given to the collective bargaining agreement by the
parties. The union contended that the severance pay was a
vested right which was retained by the employees beyond the
termination of the agreement, while the employer contended
that the right to severance pay was created by the agreement
and was extinguished when the agreement was terminated.
Therefore, under the broad language of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, which provided that "any grievance" between
19. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
20. 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
21. Id. at 550.
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the parties was subject to the grievance-arbitration procedure,
the dispute over the proper interpretation of the contract was
subject to binding arbitration.2
Nolde then raised the second and most critical issue by
contending that its duty to arbitrate ceased. Nolde contended
that not only had its contracted obligation passed with the
termination of the collective bargaining agreement, but that
the entire employee-employer relationship was severed by the
closing of the Norfolk bakery. In holding that Nolde's duty to
arbitrate the severance pay dispute survived these events the
Court relied on a line of reasoning which this author finds
unconvincing.
The Court stated that a party's obligation under the arbi-
tration clause of a contract may survive the termination of the
contract when the dispute is arguably based upon the expired
contract, even though a claim is asserted shortly after, rather
than before, the termination of the contract.2 3 Although the
Court conceded that the duty to arbitrate is founded in con-
tract and cannot be imposed on a party in the absence of a
contractual obligation, the Court also pointed out that the duty
to arbitrate survives termination of an agreement when the
dispute arises during the existence of the agreement when pro-
ceedings are not initiated until after the agreement has termi-
nated, or when proceedings are begun during the term of the
agreement but are not yet concluded at termination.24
However, under these circumstances it is the arbitral pro-
cess which extends beyond the termination of the contract, not
the employer's duty to arbitrate. In the examples used by the
Court the disputes all arose during the term of an existing
contract, when the employer was under an. affirmative contrac-
tual duty to arbitrate. Having undertaken the duty to arbi-
trate, it is only fair that the employer permit the arbitral pro-
cess to proceed to its natural conclusion.
In extending the parties' obligation to arbitrate beyond the
term of the contract the Court placed primary reliance on the
22. 97 S. Ct. at 1069.
23. Id. at 1071.
24. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). The Second and Sixth Circuits have also faced this issue; Procter & Gamble
Ind. Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 830 (1963); IAM Local 2369, v. Oxco Brush Div., 517 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1975).
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case of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.5 In that case a
union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with an
employer, Interscience Publishers, Inc. During the term of the
agreement, Interscience merged with a larger publishing firm,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and ceased to do business as a sepa-
rate entity. The Supreme Court held that John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. was obligated to arbitrate with the union over the effect
of the merger on the collective bargaining agreement. The is-
sues subject to arbitration were to include questions of sever-
ance pay and seniority which would survive the term of the
agreement.28 However, in the Wiley case, the dispute actually
arose during the term of the existing contract, and not, as here,
after the contract had terminated.
To extend the Wiley rule to disputes arising after termina-
tion, the Court relied on the case of Local 2549, Piano & Musi-
cal Instrument Workers Union v. W. W. Kimball.Y The Court's
reliance on W. W. Kimball is the weakest part of the Court's
reasoning. The W. W. Kimball case involved an agreement
between the Piano Workers and W. W. Kimball which was to
expire on October 1, 1961. In August of 1961 the employer
closed the plant where the union members were employed. On
October 8, 1961, only eight days after the contract formally
terminated, the employer opened up a new plant operation.
The members of the Piano Workers claimed that the pre-
existing contract gave them priority hiring rights according to
their seniority at the old plant.28 In a section 301 action insti-
tuted by the union, the district court held that the hiring dis-
pute question was arbitral, even though it arose eight days after
the contract terminated and was to be answered by an arbitra-
tor based upon his interpretation of the contract.29 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding that arbitration was improper be-
cause the employer had not violated the terms of the contract
while it was in existence.30 In turn, the Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit in a per curiam decision, citing only United
25. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
26. Id. at 552.
27. 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
28. See the facts as were outlined by the district court, 221 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
29. Id.
30. 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964).
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Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 1 and John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.2 It now may be implied from
the Nolde decision that in the mind of the Court the W. W.
Kimball decision stands for the proposition that termination of
a contract need not end an employer's duty to arbitrate a dis-
pute arising after the termination. However, the Court did not
explain its reasoning for this serious extension of Wiley. Nolde
leaves unclear what legal principle creates the employer's duty
to arbitrate. Apparently the Court believes that the duty to
arbitrate exists as long as the dispute is "arguably" generated
by the terminated agreement." Because this standard is amor-
phous and as yet unlimited, Nolde has created a substantial
exposure for employers to arbitrate. The Court refused to say
precisely how long after termination of the agreement the union
may wait before complaining of a contractual dispute.34 How-
ever, time does not seem to be an element of the legal standard
announced by the Court. Therefore, so long as a complaint
arises "under" the terms of a once existing collective bargain-
ing agreement that contained an arbitration clause, the em-
ployer's duty to arbitrate mysteriously continues ad infinitum.
Thus, although the duty to arbitrate is derived from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, it certainly does not depend on that
agreement for its vitality. By giving the arbitration clause sig-
nificance independent from the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the Court has contradicted both labor law precedent and
principles of national labor policy.
The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Stewart and
joined in by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, challenged the majority's
extension of the employer's duty to arbitrate beyond the term
of the collective bargaining agreement. 5 The dissent pointed
out that prior cases imposed a presumption of arbitrability
only when the dispute arose during the term of an agreement
to arbitrate .3 According to the dissent, because the majority
31. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
32. 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
33. 97 S. Ct. at 1072.
34. Id. at 1074 n.8.
35. Id. at 1074-75.
36. The dissent distinguished the majority's interpretation of the W. W. Kimball
case on this point. Mr. Justice Stevens interpreted the dispute over employee preferen-




extended the duty to arbitrate beyond the requirements of the
prior case law, the majority opinion is legally unsound:
But the duty to arbitrate can arise only upon the parties'
agreement to resolve their contractual differences in the arbi-
tral forum. And the presumptive continuation of that duty
even after the formal expiration of such an agreement can be
justified only in terms of a web of assumptions about the
continuing nature of the labor-management relationship and
the importance of having available a method harmoniously
to resolve differences arising in that relationship.37
The dissent found that an expansion of the employer's duty
to arbitrate is inconsistent with national labor policy because
it tips the delicate balance of power between labor and man-
agement established by federal laws in favor of the union. Dur-
ing a contract, the union relinquishes its freedom to strike in
return for the employer's promise to arbitrate.3 8 The effect of
the majority opinion is to release the union from its duty not
to strike while at the same time continuing to enforce the em-
ployer's duty to arbitrate.
Finally, the dissent points out that the union would not be
denied a remedy if the dispute was not held to be arbitrable.
The union could have instituted a section 30111 action based on
the employer's alleged breach of contract. Certainly this would
have been a much sounder legal approach and would have
provided a similar result.
The majority opinion further justifies its holding by invok-
ing the strong federal labor policy favoring arbitration. The
Court noted that nothing in the language of the arbitration
clause at issue expressly excludes from its operation disputes
arising after the contract had terminated." This, of course,
does not indicate a positive intention by the parties to include
such disputes within the clause, but even without an express
exclusion of post termination disputes, the Court feels labor
policy favors an extension of the duty. After Nolde, the drafting
of an arbitration clause will determine what disputes are ar-
bitrable.4' If the clause does not contain express language ne-
37. 97 S. Ct. at 1074-75.
38. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
39. 97 S. Ct. at 1075.
40. Id. at 1073.
41. This "warning" concerning the arbitration clause is similar to that given by the
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RECENT DECISIONS
gating coverage of disputes arising after the contract has ex-
pired it will be presumed that they are included in the opera-
tion of the arbitration clause.2
CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Nolde extends an employer's duty
to arbitrate union disputes to at least some disputes which
arise after the contract to arbitrate has terminated. This is not
necessarily an unwise decision by the Court, but it is a badly
reasoned one. Nolde extends the duty to arbitrate far beyond
prior Court decisions, without explaining how or why. Such an
arbitrary analysis of the law is regrettable, because it is just
such unexplained mandates like Nolde which make labor-
management relations unstable.
JOHN M. MILLER
Supreme Court in the case of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397
(1976). In that case the Court held that a simple "no-strike" clause would not cover
sympathy strikes and refused to grant a Boys Markets injunction forcing the parties
into arbitration.
42. With this argument the Court may have been answering the dissenting opinion
by circuit court Judge Widener. In his opinion Judge Widener argued that the question
of arbitrability should be decided by an arbitrator in the first instance. Only if the
arbitrator felt that he had the authority to act should he proceed to hear the merits of
the dispute. 530 F.2d at 554-58.
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